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In this paper, we present XtremWeb, a Global Computing platform used to generate monte carlos
showers in Auger [? ].
XtremWeb main goal, as a Global Computing platform, is to compute distributed applications
using idle time of widely interconnected machines. It is especially dedicated to -but not limited to-
multi-parameters applications such as monte carlos computations; its security mechanisms ensuring
not only hosts integrity but also results certification and its fault tolerant features, encouraged us
to test it and, finally, to deploy it as to support our CPU needs to simulate showers.
We first introduce Auger computing needs and how Global Computing could help. We then detail
XtremWeb architecture and goals. The fourth and last part presents the profits we have gained to
choose this platform. We conclude on what could be done next.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of the Pierre Auger Observatory is to de-
tect showers produced by the interaction of cosmic
rays of energy greater than 10E+19eV with the at-
mosphere. In order to determine the origin of these
cosmic rays, their direction and energy must be mea-
sured with accuracy. Their nature (photons, protons
or nuclei) must be known too.
These measurements are based on the properties
of the secondary particles of the shower reaching
the ground (number, position, energy, nature and
mean arrival time) and on the study of the nitrogen
fluorescence generated by these particles through the
atmosphere. However statistical fluctuations in the
development of an air-shower exist. For that reason,
the data analysis needs a large number of simulated
air-showers, with a good accuracy, to study these
fluctuations. As duration of one simulation is about
10 hours, the needed simulation computing time is
estimated at 106 hours for all the experiment.
The Aires[1] (Air-shower Extended Simulations) is
one of the main program of simulation used by the
Auger Collaboration; it is already used in Computing
Center of the IN2P3 in Lyon. As computer sciences
evolve, it appeared that we can now use new tech-
nology to break Computer Center barriers and gain
computing resources distributed among the Internet.
These new possibilities are known as Global Comput-
ing.
14Auger is an HEP experiment to study the highest energy
cosmic rays at Mallargue-Mendoza, Argentina
II. GLOBAL COMPUTING
Global computing is an intensive computer science
research field which aim is to distribute and share
computing resource (CPU, disk space etc.). Among
these proposals are different approaches which all try
to solve problems on large scale computing. This last
is a paradigm that addresses the problems of resource
sharing between distributed systems in a dynamic,
flexible, secure and non disturbing way, from within
different organizations (universities, companies etc.)
or even individuals.
The different studies around global computing are
generalized as Grid computing, but can be divided
into at least two groups, peer-to-peer computing
(P2P) and Grid [2].
“Grid” main goal is to achieve flexible and secure
large scale computing with high performances between
so called virtual organizations, entities that accept a
resource exchange policy, based on high control about
who shares what, what is shared and what are the
sharing conditions. The main toolkit, Globus [3], is
already used by several projects. Its strong security
mechanism (GSI) is one of its main contributions.
However, Globus lacks a mechanism for transparent
fault tolerance that leads to use or implement a fault
tolerance environment in top of Globus.
“P2P” has quite the same goal, to achieve flexible
and secure large scale computing with high perfor-
mances, but in a more decentralized way. P2P system
main features are resource volatility and the lack of se-
curity mechanism for resources, applications and their
results. Some P2P deployments have already shown
useful performances (SETI@Home for P2P computing
with several Teraflops, Kazaa for P2P file sharing with
one Terabits/s of service bandwidth...) and fault tol-
erance capabilities (the time between two connections
or disconnections is lower than a minute).
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III. XTREMWEB
XtremWeb is a P2P project developed at University
of Paris-Sud, France[4]. It was originally designed to
study execution models in the general framework of
Global Computing and is now a full production plat-
form too; it has been released for Linux, Windows and
MacOS-X.
Distribute applications among set of resources (i.e.
hosts) is a widely spread idea that leads different team
to work on (SETI@Home, Folding@Home), and some
projects especially focus on distribution of multi pa-
rameter applications, which need to be executed sev-
eral times with different input/parameters, each com-
putation being independent from each other. Among
such projects is Nimrod [5] which uses a static set of
resources and which security relies on standard Unix
level security. We see in following paragraphs that
XtremWeb focuses on multi parameters applications
too, but uses dynamic resources accordingly to their
availability and implements its own strong security
policy.
A. Design
XtremWeb implements three distinct entities, the
coordinator, the workers and the clients, to create
a so-called XtremWeb network (i.e. the Global
Computing platform) using connectionless protocols
only.
The coordinator masters the tasks management
process (tasks scheduling and results storage) and is
the only piece under the full control of the XtremWeb
network administrator (i.e. the user who creates an
XtremWeb network). Clients are software instances
available for any user allowed to submit tasks to the
XtremWeb network; it submits tasks to the coor-
dinator, providing binaries and optional parameter
files and permits the end user to retrieve his results.
Finally, the workers are the software part spread
among volunteer hosts to compute tasks. Everything
is written in Java language for portability purposes.
XtremWeb protocols, as defined below, resolve fire-
wall problems by using single side communications.
Firewalls are usually configured asymmetrically allow-
ing outgoing connections and blocking incoming ones.
Workers and clients behind a firewall or even a gate-
way implementing NAT can then contact the coordi-
nator and receive answers through the same opened
canal. The coordinator, which is the only one in
XtremWeb to open incoming ports, can receive con-
nections since it uses the standard Web port (80) and
firewalls are usually configured to let incoming con-
nections to this port. If the firewall in front of the
coordinator stops these connections, this will be the
only one to be reconfigured so that the full system
works.
a. The coordinator. Tasks are managed following
the coordinator-worker paradigm. One host (the co-
ordinator) manages a bag of tasks provided by clients,
coordinates their scheduling among a set of hosts (the
workers) that are volunteers provided by institutional
or private users and, as such, are not under the con-
trol of the coordinator and are very volatile in essence.
Following this concept, each action is initiated by
workers only. This behavior is commonly known as
pull model and clearly implies independence of all
components.
Scheduling is in FIFO (first in, first out) mode.
XtremWeb can schedule native and Java applications,
so there’s a match done on CPU type, OS version and
whether Java is enabled in workers. Java applications
are distributed as jar files, whereas native ones are bi-
nary.
Tasks are scheduled to workers on their specific de-
mand only since they may appear (connect to coor-
dinator) and disappear (disconnect from coordinator)
with no predictable pattern (a worker is then said con-
nected as long as it periodically contacts the coordina-
tor). Any scheduled task is expected to be computed
by a worker and have its results sent back to the coor-
dinator; on failure, the task is re-scheduled to another
worker.
b. The clients. Clients are distributed to autho-
rized users only to make them able to submit tasks
to the coordinator as transactions. Before submitting
any task, the client contacts the coordinator to fetch
any previous submitted ones. This ensures that when
the client restarts from a fault or any other reason, it
does not resubmit previously submitted tasks. Results
are managed according to the user needs. They can
be discarded immediately after fetch or kept by the
coordinator until the end of the session. So on client
failure, it is the responsibility of the client program-
mer to fetch relevant results. An API is implemented
to provide such secure implementations.
c. The workers. Workers are distributed entity
to volunteer institutional or individual PCs, which
aim to use CPU accordingly to a local user cus-
tomizable policy (available scheduling time, CPU
usage conditions...) to compute tasks provided by
the coordinator. A worker requests task to compute
accordingly to its own local policy; it downloads
task software and all expected objects (input file,
arguments...), stores them on reliable media and
starts computing the provided tasks. Computation
goes on locally until it ends or dies for any reason,
including due to host utilization policy rules. As com-
putation is started, the worker periodically signals the
coordinator, so that last knows the computation goes
on well. If unable to connect (coordinator or network
shut down), the worker still continues computation
and will signal the coordinator as soon as possible.
Insert PSN Here
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After any failure (network or host shut down, or local
usage policy rule) the worker retrieves its current
state; it restarts the interrupted task, if any, from the
beginning as there is no checkpoint[6] implemented
in XtremWeb and signal the coordinator the task it
is computing. A worker may then be asked to stop
computing, if it task has been rescheduled.
When a task is completed, the worker sends results
back to the coordinator and ask for another one.
B. Fault tolerance
Several fault tolerance mechanisms are used in
XtremWeb to handle clients, workers and coordinator
failures. The main purpose of these mechanisms is to
enable the system to restart properly after any failure
(worker, client and coordinator). It is not currently
intended to provide minimum service interruption
using techniques like redundancy, but is planned as
future work.
The coordinator manages its tasks using trans-
actions and stores them in reliable media (disk) so
that the full system integrity is preserved even if the
coordinator shuts down for any reason (crash or sys-
tem management). At starting time, the coordinator
reads the information stored on reliable media to set
up its proper state; it then retrieves tasks (scheduled
and awaiting ones). The client submits tasks and the
worker fetches tasks using transactions. This ensures
a consistent state when the coordinator restarts from
fault while the client and the worker have not failed.
Worker faults are detected thanks to the alive signal
and their tasks may then be rescheduled on another
available worker. A worker can impromptingly be
told to stop its current task if it has been disconnected
for too long (i.e. if it has not signaled the coordinator
in time) to avoid redundant task and, more, result
overwriting.
XtremWeb then achieve to prevent fault tolerance
transparently for user, using resilient components
fetching their context before restarting.
C. Security
XtremWeb has the responsibility to ensure user
authentication, hosts (workers) integrity, application
and results protection and user execution logging.
Security mainly relies on three completer mecha-
nisms : a list of authorized users as ACLs managed
by the coordinator, authentication of the coordinator
by workers and clients and self-protection of workers
by the use of sand boxing system utility.
All tasks are submitted to the workers through the
coordinator credential and contain a descriptor with
the actual user identity so that workers and coordi-
nator can take appropriate corrective action (user re-
vocation), in case of security problem. Therefore it
is a first concern to ensure that workers and clients
connect to the appropriate coordinator. To do so,
all communications to the coordinator are performed
within a SSL tunnel. To open the connection a chal-
lenge is run using the public key (certificate) of the
coordinator, previously inserted within the worker or
client software. We suppose that the download and
installation of the worker/client is a safe stage in the
process. As the coordinator certificate is the only one
contained in the list of trusted keys (the list itself can-
not be updated) , this prevents the “Man in the Mid-
dle” attack, because the attacker would have to own
the private key of the coordinator to let the SSL ses-
sion to be established. This mechanism prevents ma-
licious participants to be able to intercept and read
any connection, and to connect to the coordinator; it
also prevents workers/clients to connect to a wrong
XtremWeb coordinator. On the contrary client and
worker are not authenticated by the coordinator be-
side the use of the couple login/password. This point
requires the maintenance of a database which could
be evicted by integrating a certificate/signature sys-
tem like PKI or GSI in Globus.
XtremWeb workers protect their host by im-
plementing sand boxing[7, 8, 9] to secure binary
application executions, providing rights to do some
actions and denying some others since binary ap-
plications have access to the full hosting system by
nature. Workers are configured to run any task of
that type inside a sand box which is fully customiz-
able, from memory usage to file system operations.
Java applications, on their side, are always executed
inside a virtual machine which includes security[11];
XtremWeb uses this functionality in two levels, one
for the worker itself and a more restrictive one for the
downloaded Java byte code. Java virtual machines,
as sand boxes, have a performance cost[10].
Finally, XtremWeb must ensure application, pa-
rameters and results integrity. Even if all these objects
(binary, parameters and results) are safely transferred,
they are still vulnerable inside the worker host itself
as they are stored onto disk. The major difficulty then
comes from two points. The first is that anybody (or
at least the host owner) have the full access of hosting
machine, even XtremWeb worker temporary files (bi-
nary, parameters and results). The second point is on
XtremWeb open source policy, which makes protec-
tion coding ineffective since anybody can download
the source code. The XtremWeb team is currently
working on this problem and will present results on
paper to come.
Host and connection security is achieved in
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XtremWeb that can then be deployed being sure vol-
unteer hosts integrity is guaranteed. There’s still ap-
plications and their results to be certified and, as pre-
viously said, these subjects are under work by the
XtremWeb team.
D. User experiences and feedback
XtremWeb is already used by several projects as
listed below:
• CGP2P ACI GRID (academic research on Desk-
top Grid systems), France
• Industry research project (Airbus + Alcatel
Space), France
• IFP (French Petroleum Institute), France
• EADS (Airplane + Ariane rocket manufac-
turer), France
• University of Geneva, (research on Desktop Grid
systems), Switzerland
• University of Wisconsin Madison, Condor+XW,
USA
• University of Guadeloupe + Paster Institute
(Research on tuberculosis), France
• Mathematics lab University of Paris South
(PDE solver research) , France
• University of Lille (control language for Desktop
Grid systems), France
• ENS Lyon: research on large scale storage,
France
IV. AUGER SIMULATIONS DISTRIBUTED
WITH XTREMWEB
Prior to any proposal to introduce XtremWeb into
Auger simulated showers management, we decided to
make some experimentations. We introduced 1024
identical Aires tasks into the XtremWeb network to
determine how the full system reacts. Each task is
computed in about 18 minutes on the reference host, a
mono-processor PIII 733Mhz. These 1024 tasks would
take 307 hours on that host.
Figure 1 shows the experimentation platform we
used to test XtremWeb to distribute simulation com-
putations over three different sites: two sites in
France, one at the LRI and the other at Grenoble,
and one site in Wisconsin, USA.
The coordinator run on a dedicated machine at
LRI. Workers run on different sites, managed by
batch systems to make the deployment just easier; we
deployed then our XtremWeb workers as tasks locally
managed by provided batch systems. Grenoble site
uses PBS [12] whereas Wisconsin and LRI sites use
Condor[13]. As these two batch systems use different
resource allocation policies, no prediction can be
made about how and when our workers are scheduled.
Figure 1 also shows some workers not included in any
cluster. This is to make clear that XtremWeb workers
don’t need to be managed by any cluster and may
be run on any personal computer. Our experiments
used workers on clusters only to keep management as
easiest as possible.
We have made five experiments : WISC-97 (97
processors at Wisconsin), WL-113 (113 processors at
Wisconsin and LRI), G-146 (146 processors at Greno-
ble), WLG-270 (270 processors at Wisconsin, LRI and
Grenoble) and WLG-451 (451 processors at Wiscon-
sin, LRI and Grenoble).
Figure 2 shows works execution time for each task,
decreasingly sorted. We note the remarkable stabil-
ity of the system at Grenoble (G-146 curve) where all
hosts are identical (CPU, memory...) whereas WISC-
97 clearly shows two levels corresponding on the two
available host types (PIII 533Mhz and 900Mhz). That
last does not show the stability found in G-146. This
is because Condor may simultaneously allocate the
same resource (i.e. the same CPU) to different tasks,
depending on the local resource management policy
and, in another hand, because the network bandwidth
is not the same between Wisconsin and LRI, and be-
tween Grenoble and LRI.
Figure 3 shows resource utilization for each exper-
imentation. All curves show three different steps.
The first is the power slope as CPU are allocated by
clusters; then we reach the efficient power utilization
which finally decreases as experimentation ends.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Figure 4 shows Auger configuration for Monte Car-
los computations as we expect it to be in near future,
as tests are fully convincing. We can see that Auger
will use two different ways to compute its simulated
showers; the first one uses “standard” CPU power
provided by traditional computing centers whereas
the other implements an XtremWeb network. Both
are connected to Auger database (Auger DB) at
Lyon, France to get informations about showers and
to generate and store generated showers.
Parts will be deployed as follow:
• a daemon (Xw Auger) as XtremWeb client; it
scans Auger DB for new showers to be gener-
ated and submits them to the coordinator. On
Insert PSN Here
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FIG. 1: XtremWeb experimentation configuration.
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FIG. 2: Work execution time.
the other hand, its periodically connects to the
coordinator to retrieve results, if any;
• the coordinator is then not connected by itself
to Auger DB; it definitely knows nothing specific
to Auger and only sees a client (Xw Auger) as
it would for any XtremWeb client as previously
defined;
• the workers are widely distributed among volun-
teer collaboration hosts. They download Aires
binary, a shower simulator, compute the shower
and send results back to the coordinator. Again,
this XtremWeb component has just nothing spe-
cific to Auger.
The first phase will accept worker connections from
collaboration hosts only since the XtremWeb results
certification is not available yet.
We have presented a Global Computing platform,
XtremWeb, which usage experiment has presented an
easy and convenient way to answer our CPU needs for
monte carlos computations. This platform achieves to
resolve most of the problems encountered by any Grid
system such as scalability, fault tolerance and security.
As our tests have completed, we believe that this
platform responds to the expectations of Auger users
who would easily deploy workers among PCs of the
collaboration so that an effective XtremWeb network
could grow and propose a non-negligible CPU power.
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FIG. 4: XtremWeb configuration for Auger.
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